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In the battle of slogans in unconstitutional conditions cases, all
would agree that "government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly" has won out over "the greater power to deny includes the
lesser power to grant upon condition." That is, the Supreme Court
commonly states as a truism that government may not grant even a
gratuitous benefit on condition that the beneficiary relinquish a con-
stitutional right. While government allocation of benefits is normally
accorded deference, stronger justification is required if an allocation
discriminates on the basis of the exercise of a right. This is the key
proposition of unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
But the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a doctrine in search
of a theory. Three persistent candidates have proved strangely unsat-
isfying. This essay first describes those candidate theories and their
shortcomings, and then suggests an alternative approach, which it
finally applies to several techniques for discouraging abortion
"indirectly."
I. THREE LEADING THEORIES
The first theory treats unconstitutional conditions as a problem of
coercion. Government may influence our decisions about how to ex-
ercise our rights, but it may not make us rights-pressuring offers that
we cannot refuse, or would prefer never to have received. This prob-
lem is frequently depicted in cases as one depending on the degree of
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psychological pressure: a rights-pressuring offer of benefits becomes
void when it "pass[es] the point at which 'pressure turns into com-
pulsion.' "I It surfaces in commentary as a matter of distinguishing
"threats" from "offers" - that is, distinguishing proposals that
worsen from those that better the lot of the offeree, in relation to
some baseline course of events that the offeree expects or deserves.2
Searching for coercion in the unconstitutional conditions setting,
however, is misguided for two reasons. First, it is intractable. Distin-
guishing offers that coerce from those that merely tempt, persuade,
or induce is an irreducibly normative inquiry: it depends on a theory
of when choice is wrongly constrained. This point is commonly ac-
knowledged in other contexts, such as the distinction between duress
and permissible forms of advantage-taking in contract,' or the dis-
tinction between blackmail and legitimate forms of commercial ex-
change.4 In other words, a "threat" cannot be distinguished from an
"offer" without some notion of why the offeree is entitled to expect
better than what is being extended to her.
But such a notion is fatally elusive in unconstitutional conditions
cases, where the government benefits at issue are gratuitous. In a
constitutional order where most government redistribution is permis-
sible, but virtually none is compelled, welfare, tax benefits, and the
like are matters of political grace. Where no reliance interests are
recognized 5 and all minimally rational allocation patterns are per-
mitted,6 there simply is no normally or morally expected course of
events from which "coercive" departures can be measured. In a
world without baselines, coercion cannot be tracked.
Even if coercion could be tracked, the coercion inquiry is mis-
guided here for a second reason: it is too narrow. Some constitutional
liberties protect us specifically against coercion; the fifth amend-
ment's command that no person be "compelled" to incriminate him-
self is the best example. But most others protect more: the first
amendment protects speech not only from coercion but also from
chill; the abortion right has been construed to bar not only criminal
1. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
2. The terminology here is from Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND
METHOD 440 (S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M. White eds. 1969), as thoughtfully ap-
plied to the unconstitutional conditions problem in Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1353-55
(1984).
3. See, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 97 (1981); Kronman, Contract Law
and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
4. See, e.g., Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
670 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-11 (1960).
6. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179
(1980).
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sanctions but also far less coercive deterrents. Government infringe-
ment of constitutional rights normally need not rise to the level of
coercion to be improper. If "direct" regulations are struck down
short of the "point where pressure turns into compulsion" why de-
mand more before invalidating "indirect" restraints?
These difficulties prompt consideration of a second leading candi-
date for the theory underlying the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine. This theory would focus not on whether the beneficiary is free
to refuse an offer, but on whether government should be free to
make it. This approach would invalidate conditions that reflect de-
fects in legislative process. A recurrent formulation of this approach
holds that government may not "extort" or "manipulate" benefi-
ciaries by attaching nongermane conditions to benefits. The best re-
cent example is the Court's qualified condemnation of development
exactions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.7 That deci-
sion held California's offer to exchange a beachhouse building per-
mit for a public right of way through the owner's backyard to be an
impermissible end-run around the takings clause. But the majority
suggested that making the same trade for a public "viewing spot"
would have been just fine - even though the public would have oc-
cupied the land equally whether walking or looking." What was the
difference? Because preserving the public's view of the sea might
have been a good reason to deny the building permit outright, trad-
ing the permit for a viewing spot was germane. In contrast, a lateral
passageway became an "'extortion [ate]'" taking because insuffi-
ciently related to the purposes for which the building permit could
have been denied.9
Germaneness, however, is a poor benchmark for distinguishing
constitutional from unconstitutional conditions. When nongermane
conditions serve legitimate public ends other than those served by
the benefit, why should they automatically be suspect? Such legisla-
tive package deals may reflect simple logrolling as usual. 10 Addition-
7. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
8. Id. at 836.
9. Id. at 837. For an analysis of germaneness in the context of conditions on ac-
cess to public highways quite parallel to Justice Scalia's in Nollan, see Hale, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLuM. L. REV. 321, 350-52 (1935).
10. The Court has relaxed its suspicion of such logrolling since the New Deal,
when no entrenched political disadvantage has been shown. See generally J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). Cases like Smith v.
Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931), which invalidated a break for farmers from highway
safety regulations on the ground of nongermaneness, must therefore now be regarded as
relics.
ally, why should germane conditions automatically be treated as be-
nign? Whether government uses its zoning leverage to exact a
viewing spot or a lateral passageway, the political safeguards of the
eminent domain process are missing.'
A third possible theory for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
would treat constitutional rights as inalienable: some reason keeps
them off the government benefits "market." This theory is suggested
by Justice Douglas's remark that government should not be permit-
ted "to 'buy up' rights guaranteed by the Constitution."12 But such a
general theory is difficult to defend, for the liberties pressured in un-
constitutional conditions cases protect autonomous decision-making
that a general rule of inalienability would contradict.' 3 The real
question in unconstitutional conditions cases is not whether constitu-
tional liberties may ever be alienated; it is whether they may be
alienated to government. The inquiry, in other words, must be not
about paternalism, efficiency, or personhood, which are frequently
the bases for inalienability arguments; 4 it must be about distribu-
tion. The next section outlines such a theory.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY
Preferred constitutional liberties do not simply protect individual
autonomy, but serve three important distributive functions as well:
First, they check the power of the state by preserving a private or-
der; second, they impose obligations of government evenhandedness
or neutrality among rightholders who, for example, speak, worship,
or procreate according to different lights; and third, they bar a sys-
tem of constitutional caste among rightholders. The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is best understood as necessary to preserve all
three distributive functions.
The first function, state-checking, in no way depends on a natural
or prepolitical definition of the boundary between public and private
spheres. That boundary is obviously a social construct; a state-check-
ing approach simply asserts that it is a boundary worth drawing. In
this approach, whatever the value of free speech to self-actualization,
it is surely valuable to permit the expression of deviant or dissenting
views that keep the state from replicating itself. Likewise, in this
approach, whatever the value of the right of privacy to self-defini-
11. Cf. Pennell v. City of San Jose,485 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing political safeguards of regulation from
those of eminent domain).
12. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 328 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13. Speech and privacy are paradigm examples. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the right of privacy protects from governmental in-
trusion "the decision whether to bear or beget a child").
14. See generally Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
[VOL. 26: 327, 1989] Distribution of Liberty
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tion,15 it is surely valuable to prevent the state from cloning orthodox
citizens from a single intimate associational mold.16
Rights-pressuring conditions on government benefits affect the bal-
ance of power by shifting private exercises of rights in a direction
favored by the state. The magnitude of the shift will not depend on
whether citizens view government offers as coercion or mere tempta-
tion; incumbents are entrenched, for example, whether they use
bribes or fines to induce their opponents to switch sides. Rather, the
magnitude of the shift will depend on factors such as the extent to
which the government has displaced private alternative providers of
a benefit. In the extreme case, when government has a complete mo-
nopoly over a benefit essential to the exercise of a liberty, it may
even have some limited affirmative obligation to maintain the mini-
mal preconditions necessary for the liberty's exercise; leaving un-
paved a unique Native American worship site in a national forest
might be one such example.'7 But even short of such a monopoly,
whenever government has taken services (such as education, provi-
sions of minimal subsistence, or medical insurance to the indigent)
significantly out of private control, it attains proportionate power to
crowd out deviance and dissent through benefit conditions.
The second function, requiring government evenhandedness among
holders of preferred constitutional liberties, is best exemplified by
speech. It is underscored by the Supreme Court's repeated dictum in
unconstitutional conditions cases that government may not impose
benefit conditions that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, or
cc "ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas." ' " If a Demo-
cratic regime offers tax benefits to Republicans who convert, the
structural harm is not only that the existing government entrenches
itself by eroding its critics' ground, as discussed above, but also that
opposing viewpoints are treated unequally. Speaking power is redis-
tributed as readily through partisan favoritism in the allocation of
benefits as through punitive measures against the opposition.
The third function, preventing constitutional caste among
15. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-05 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
16. See Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
17. Cf. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(rejecting a similar free exercise claim on the ground that government "coercion" was
absent).
18. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (quoting
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1969) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
rightholders, concerns a different sort of evenhandedness, of a verti-
cal rather than a horizontal kind. As the fundamental rights branch
of equal protection doctrine suggests, some rights may be too impor-
tant to be allocated according to a hierarchy of relative dependence
on government. For example, if marriage is a fundamental right,
then debtors should be as free as the well-off to divorce and re-
marry.' 9 Conditions on benefits can pose a similar danger of hierar-
chy. Conditioning public assistance to mothers with dependent chil-
dren on sterilization after the third child, for example, would mark
out an inferior reproductive caste just as the state scheme struck
down in Skinner v. Oklahoma did by putting the surgeon's knife to
recidivist thieves.
20
III. APPLICATIONS TO "INDIRECT" ABORTION RESTRICTIONS
The distributive functions of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine are best illustrated by example. Consider these possible meth-
ods for a government, bent on discouraging abortions, to do so
through "indirect" rather than "direct" regulation.
First, to discourage abortion, government can furnish public insur-
ance for the medical costs of pregnancy and childbirth but not abor-
tion. This sort of selective subsidy was upheld in the abortion fund-
ing cases.21 Second, it can bar public hospitals or public employees
from performing abortions - even if they are paid for wholly by the
patient's private funds rather than by taxpayers' funds. This was one
of the sorts of regulation the Supreme Court upheld in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Service.22 Third, it can furnish subsidies to
family planning clinics on condition that recipients do not "en-
courage, promote, or advocate" abortion as a method of family plan-
ning. This is a type of government regulation whose constitutionality
has divided several lower courts.23 Which, if any, of these schemes
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny under the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions?
Contrary to the Court's rulings in the abortion funding cases, the
19. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971).
20. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
21. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
22, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
23. Compare Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1988) (invali-
dating such a condition), en banc reh'q granted, No. 88-1279 (1st Cir. Aug. 9, 1989)
with New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding that condi-
tion), affid sub nona. New York v. Sullivan, No. 88-6204 (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 1989)
(WEsTLAW, 1989 W.L. 131669). The eighth circuit, in Webster, also invalidated a re-
striction of this third kind - a ban on the encouragement or counseling of abortion in
public facilities or by public employees, but the Supreme Court reversed that holding.
109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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first scheme - selective subsidies for the medical costs of pregnancy
and childbirth but not abortion - should have been an easy candi-
date for strict review. The Court's reasoning was simply that the
government has committed no coercive act. As argued above, how-
ever, coercion analysis is treacherous in the unconstitutional condi-
tions area, and the Court's conclusory analysis in the abortion fund-
ing cases illustrates its perils. In concluding that selective subsidies
imposed no "penalty," but merely embodied a "refusal to fund pro-
tected activity," 24 the Court wrongly ignored the scheme's deterrent
effects on abortion even if they fell short of coercion.25 The Court
also assumed, without argument, a questionable baseline: to be sure,
the government made poor women no worse off if the appropriate
baseline was no funding, but it did make them worse off (and thus
arguably coerced them) if the appropriate baseline was funding for
all medical needs (including those related to reproduction).
If distributive analysis is substituted for the treacheous coercion
inquiry, the abortion funding cases can be seen as clearly wrongly
decided. Giving heightened constitutional protection to autonomous
private decision-making over reproduction serves a state-checking
goal; it takes the state out of the business of reproductive choice. To
the extent the selective subsidy scheme shifts the reproductive
choices of a substantial segment of the pregnant population in a di-
rection favored by the government, it extends unacceptable leverage
to the state over what ought to be private decision-making. It might
be objected that this leverage is limited so long as well-off women
may continue to satisfy preferences for abortion that indigent women
may not.
But even if that were so, the other two distributive concerns dis-
cussed above (evenhandedness and preventing constitutional caste
among rightholders) would nonetheless warrant subjecting the selec-
tive subsidy scheme to heightened review. Roe v. Wade 6 should be
understood as requiring government neutrality toward a given wo-
man's reproductive choice, and thus as requiring government even-
24. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
25. In other contexts, by contrast, the Court treated deterrence (foregoing the
right to get the benefit) as an interchangeable surrogate for a "penalty" (foregoing the
benefit to preserve the right) worked by an unconstitutional condition. See, e.g., Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1974). Moreover, the Court has
rightly struck down "direct" regulations of abortion whose deterrent effect hardly rose to
the coercive level of criminal sanctions. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
handedness between pregnant women seeking abortion and those
seeking delivery. Privacy rights, no less than speech rights, protect
against government-induced orthodoxy; privacy should entail govern-
ment evenhandedness between the choice of abortion or childbirth,
just as freedom of speech entails viewpoint-neutrality. The govern-
ment's selective subsidy program redistributes power from abortion-
seekers to child-bearers in violation of this evenhandedness obliga-
tion.27 Finally, even if neither of the first two arguments were ac-
cepted, the abortion funding cases present the danger of constitu-
tional caste in classic form: fundamental rights that the government
may not restrict for all should not be restricted for those over whom
government has special leverage because of their dependency.
The second scheme to discourage abortion - closing public health
care to abortion - should even more readily merit strict scrutiny.
The evenhandedness and caste arguments are parallel to those just
made, but the state-leverage argument is perhaps even stronger: hav-
ing set up a system of public health care that substantially displaces
private alternatives, government should be estopped from banishing
abortion physically as well as financially to the remaining private
sector.28
The third scheme - the anti-abortion-counseling condition on
family planning funds - should also be strictly scrutinized. To the
extent that this restriction on the medical advice given by public
health clinics burdens the right to abortion itself,29 it should be
strictly scrutinized as an infringement of privacy. It is a privacy in-
fringement, despite its limitation to the fourteen and one-half million
women who use the services of federally funded clinics, for the same
reasons as the selective subsidy scheme just discussed.
But even if the abortion funding rulings preclude such an argu-
ment, the second scheme should nonetheless be strictly scrutinized as
an infringement of the providers' right to speak and their clients'
right to hear. Even in rejecting unconstitutional conditions chal-
lenges, the Court has always reiterated that government may not
purchase one-sided ventriloquy for its causes through viewpoint dis-
crimination when allocating benefits.30 Applying each of the three
27. This argument parallels the account of appropriate government neutrality to-
ward religious education presented in McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecog-
nized Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 255 (1989).
28. The public forum doctrine reflects analogous considerations in the realm of
speech. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Schnei-
der v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
29. Cf. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 760-63 (1986) (invalidating a state law requiring all physicians to present
patients seeking abortions with detailed information about fetal development and alterna-
tives to abortion).
30. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983). The
one-sidedness of the family planning regulations currently under challenge is underscored
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distributive concerns discussed above to the anti-abortion counseling
scheme helps illustrate why. First, by eliminating a significant num-
ber of pro-abortion messages at their point of greatest impact, gov-
ernment redistributes speaking power in a direction favored by the
state and so undercuts dissent. Second, government's obligation of
evenhandedness is arguably even stronger with respect to funding
speech about abortion than with respect to funding abortions them-
selves. And third, the regulation divides pregnant women into two
castes: those who can get full medical information from their doctors
and those whose dependency on government relegates them to hear-
ing only half the story.
It is no answer to argue, as the federal government has in the
currently pending cases, that public health clinics are free to con-
tinue abortion referrals or counseling from facilities "physically and
financially separate" from their federally funded ones. 31 For the
Court has previously recognized that rigid administrative segregation
requirements can in themselves impermissibly burden speech,32 and
in the absence of strong justification, government should no more be
able to purchase such segregation than to command it.33
In sum, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should extend
strict scrutiny to all three of these governmental techniques for redis-
tributing power away from those who would favor or seek abortion.
Several caveats are in order. To say this much is not to condemn
every program that might marginally decrease the incentive to
by the fact that they not only ban speech counseling abortion, but require speech promot-
ing "the welfare of the mother and unborn child." See Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F.
Supp. 137, 139 (D. Mass. 1988), en banc reh'g granted, No. 88-1279 (Ist Cir. Aug. 9,
1989).
31. Compare Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. at 146-47 (rejecting this argu-
ment) with New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd sub
nom. New York v. Sullivan, No. 88-6204 (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989 W.L.
131669) (accepting it).
32. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (invali-
dating a requirement that political funds be segregated in corporate treasuries, as applied
to political nonprofit corporation).
33. To be sure, Massachusetts Citizens is in some tension with Taxation with
Representation, which in effect approved the segregation of lobbying from nonlobbying
activities by nonprofit organizations seeking maximum tax benefits under the tax code.
See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544; id. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). But the Court's attempt to distinguish the cases by fiat is wholly unconvincing. See
Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 256 n.9. In any event, the Court has recognized, in
at least one case since Taxation with Representation, that requiring public funding re-
cipients to segregate their activities would impermissibly burden speech. See FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-401 (1984). On the potential difficulties of
segregation of religious from secular activities, see McConnell, Political and Religious
Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 405.
choose abortion over childbirth; publicly funded nutritional supple-
ments to indigent' pregnant women, for example, should not fall on
account of any such incidental byproduct. All three programs dis-
cussed here, however, have as their overt intent and foreseeably sig-
nificant consequence that women dependent on government pro-
grams will forego abortions they otherwise would have had; in such
cases, no such problems of marginal overbreadth arise.3 4 Addition-
ally, to recognize that rights are burdened in these cases is not to
decide the constitutionality of the condition; the question of justifica-
tion remains. Protecting taxpayers from violation of conscience
through actual or symbolic entanglement of public programs with
abortion might be offered as a compelling justification for the pro-
grams described.3 5 But the possibility of such a justification should
not be confused with the absence of a burden in the first place.
IV. CONCLUSION
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine should be liberated from
conclusory distinctions between coercion and consent, threats and of-
fers, penalties and nonsubsidies, germane and nongermane condi-
tions, or alienable and inalienable rights. A distributive analysis of
unconstitutional conditions that considers the balance of power and
freedom in the polity as a whole has considerable advantages over
analyses that focus on whether individual beneficiaries have been co-
erced, legislatures have strayed from proper deliberation, or rights
are exchangeable in the abstract.
34. A small adoption tax credit enacted with express antiabortion intent would
exemplify a harder intermediate case, for it would couple the intent to deter abortion
with a relatively trivial probable effect.
35. On balance, such an argument should fail because even if such taxpayers' in-
terests were recognized, as they are not in other contexts (see, e.g., Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)), they could be accommodated by less restrictive means
such as earmarking.
